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Abstract
The 1971 ruling of the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v.
Priest initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local financing of public
schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how
much to spend on their schools to a centralized one in which the state legislature
determines the expenditures of every school district. This paper begins by describing California’s school finance system before Serrano and the transformation from
local to state finance. It then delineates some consequences of that transformation
and draws lessons from California’s experience with school finance reform.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H1, H2, I2
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Though public education is the largest category of local public expenditure, Tiebout (1956) didn't
make public schools the primary example in his classic theory of those expenditures. Perhaps inspired by
his locale, he chose to exemplify his theory by a community with a 500 yard beach. Whatever the
motivation, his choice was a prudent one. It is one thing to argue for the efficiency of partitioning
families among communities according to their demand for beach space; it is quite another to advance the
same argument for partitioning families according to their demand for something as important as the
education of their children.
Oates (1969) was more forthright. In his seminal paper on capitalization, he explicitly defined
and estimated the price of public school quality. Families got good schools for their children if they were
willing to pay for them. Moreover, in his theory of fiscal federalism, Oates (1972) had a ready answer for
those who might object that the willingness to pay for good public schools is determined largely by a
family's income. The equitable distribution of income is best addressed at a higher level of government,
Oates argued; a public service should be provided by the lowest level of government consistent with
economies of scale. Because economies of scale in education are achieved at very low populations
(Kenny (1982)), public education ought to be provided by many, small school districts; higher levels of
government can deal with the inequities stemming from that system.
Legal theorists didn't see it that way. Looking at the local provision of public education through
the lens of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), they saw the wide disparities in spending per pupil
across school districts as just another violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This view had its first legal victory in California with the ruling of the state’s Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest (1971). The ruling initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local
financing of public schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance
system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how much to spend on their schools to
a centralized one in which the state legislature determines the expenditures of every school district. The
Serrano ruling led to similar rulings in other states, although no state reacted quite as radically as
California.
It would be an exaggeration to claim that California's transformation was a natural experiment in
fiscal federalism. The Serrano ruling could have led the state down many different paths, and the path
California chose reflected its own complex politics. That qualification notwithstanding, California’s story
has many lessons for students of fiscal federalism. We begin that story by describing California’s school
finance system before Serrano. We then trace the transformation from local to state finance and delineate
some consequences of that transformation. Our account concludes with lessons from California’s
experience.
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1. School Finance in 1970 and the Serrano Ruling
California school districts differ considerably in size and grade span. In 1969-70, there were 236
unified districts (kindergarten to grade 12), 723 elementary districts, and 120 high school districts. Sixtyfour percent of students were enrolled in unified districts, with an average enrollment of 12,452. One of
those districts, Los Angeles Unified, had over 650,000 students, 14 percent of the state’s total. No other
district was even remotely as large (San Diego was second with 130,000 students), though there were
twelve districts with more than 35,000 students. All twelve were unified districts. In contrast, the
average enrollment for the elementary districts was only 1,573. High school districts averaged 4,488
students. Though these smaller districts were numerous, it is important to remember that per pupil
statistics for California public schools are significantly influenced by a few large districts.
California school districts were larger on average than districts in other states. In California, the
average was about 4,200 students; in the rest of the country, the average was less than 2,500. The larger
average for California was partly due to the state’s program to encourage the unification of elementary
and high school districts. In 1935, the state had over 3,000 districts, none of them unified. By 1965,
there were less than 1,500 districts, 191 of which were unified. In addition, during the same period in
which the number of districts fell by half, the state’s population tripled.
Before the Serrano decision, California’s school finance system was similar to systems in other
states. School districts levied their own property tax rates, and the state supplemented that revenue with
apportionments from the state school fund. The state apportionments were based on a foundation formula
with a minimum, called basic aid. The state imposed a maximum on each district’s general purpose tax
rate, and that maximum could only be exceeded if approved by a majority of a district’s voters. In 196869, all but eleven districts had rates in excess of this maximum, making school levy elections a regular
occurrence. Districts could also impose of number of special tax rates without voter approval. The
revenues from these special rates were earmarked for specific purposes. Property taxes were about 55
percent of the total revenue of school districts.
Assessed value per pupil differed widely across districts. In unified districts, 25 percent of
students were enrolled in districts with assessed value per pupil above $13,456, and 25 percent were in
districts with assessed value per pupil less than $7,946, a gap of 69 percent. The gap between the top 5
percent and the bottom 5 percent was 343 percent. Similar disparities existed for elementary and high
school districts.
The disparities in assessed value per pupil were greater than the disparities in revenue per pupil.
The state apportionment formula distributed more state aid to school districts with lower assessed value
per pupil, and school districts with low assessed value tended to levy higher tax rates. For students in
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unified districts, the gap in revenue per pupil between the top 25 percent and the bottom 25 percent was
only 14 percent. However, the gap between the top 5 percent and the bottom 5 percent was 70 percent.
Disparities in both revenue and assessed value caused the Serrano complaint. Specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that those differences violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the legal framework that was developed from previous Supreme Court rulings, a state could
classify people differently under the law if it had a reasonable rationale for doing so. Under certain
circumstances, however, the state faced a higher hurdle in proving that its laws were reasonable. If a law
affected a fundamental right, such as voting, and involved a suspect classification of people, such as race,
the state's law would be subject to "strict scrutiny." The Warren Court expanded the definition of both
fundamental rights and suspect classifications. In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), it declared that
education was a fundamental right. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966), it overturned
Virginia's poll tax because it declared individual wealth a suspect classification. In Baker v. Carr (1962),
the Court declared that legislative districts had to have equal populations, making geography, in some
respects, a suspect classification. Reviewing those rulings, Wise (1967) argued that the local provision of
education must also violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had ruled that education was a
fundamental right and that wealth and geography were suspect classifications, so a system in which the
quality of local public schools depends on geography and the wealth of families and their neighbors
would not pass judicial scrutiny.
Similar theories were being advanced by Harold Horowitz (1966), a law professor at UCLA.
Horowitz found a receptive audience in Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Bell had worked with Thurgood Marshall in
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and was head of the Western Center of Law and Poverty,
a public interest law firm funded by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. The two decided to test
Horowitz's theories in court, making the Serrano suit the product of the "egalitarian revolution" spawned
by the Warren Court (Kurland (1963)) and the war on poverty initiated by President Lyndon Johnson.
The plaintiffs were a number of school children and their parents, including John Serrano, Jr., a parent.
The defendants were a number of state and local government officials, including Ivy Baker Priest, state
treasurer.
In their complaint, the Serrano lawyers made two specific claims. The two claims seem quite
different, but they were connected by the plaintiffs’ belief that assessed value per pupil was highly
correlated with family income.1 One claim was that, because assessed value per pupil varied across
school districts, taxpayers in districts with low assessed value per pupil had to pay higher tax rates to
achieve the same spending per pupil. The other claim was that students from disadvantaged families
might require more educational resources than other students to have the same educational opportunities.
The assumed correlation between income and assessed valuation implied that the taxpayers in districts
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with low assessed value per pupil were also low-income families who needed to spend more on their
children’s education. To provide the same educational opportunity for their children, low-income
families would have to pay higher tax rates than other families. With regard to a fundamental right,
education, the state treated individuals differently according to a suspect classification, wealth.
The Serrano complaint was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, but the claims of the plaintiffs
were not immediately tested in court. The defendants demurred, the plaintiffs appealed, and the case
eventually reached the California Supreme Court. Because of two other events, the Serrano lawyers
narrowed their argument to the fiscal inequities of the school finance system. The first event was the
ruling of a federal court in McInnis v. Shapiro. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed a violation of equal
protection because the school finance system in Illinois did not provide enough revenue to meet the
educational needs of disadvantaged students. The federal court rejected that argument because
educational need was too nebulous to adjudicate. McInnis was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which affirmed the decision of the lower court. As a consequence, in their appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the Serrano lawyers downplayed their claim about the additional resource needs of
disadvantaged students and focused more on the fiscal inequities arising from variations in assessed value
per pupil. The Serrano lawyers were aided in this new focus by the second event, the 1970 publication of
Private Wealth and Public Education, by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman. Coons and his co-authors took a
more conservative approach than Horowitz in their legal critique of public school finance. They did not
include differing educational needs as an element in their critique, taking revenue per pupil as the
measure of educational quality. This measure put a spotlight on the fiscal inequities due to variations in
assessed value per pupil.
The California Supreme Court accepted the logic of Coons and co-authors. It ruled that education
was a fundamental right and school district wealth was a suspect classification. Differences in revenue
per pupil due to differences in assessed value per pupil thus violated equal protection. In declaring
district wealth a suspect classification, the court had entered new territory. The defendants argued that the
concept of a suspect classification was meant to be applied to individuals, not to government entities.
This argument would have required the plaintiffs to show that there was a correlation between the
assessed value of a district and the income of families living in that district. The court rejected that
argument, however, ruling that discrimination on the basis of district wealth is as invalid as discrimination
based on individual wealth. The Supreme Court returned the case to the Superior Court for hearing, but
its ground rules determined the outcome. The lower court was not required to examine evidence about
the relationship between assessed value and family income or spending per pupil and family income. It
could focus instead on variation in assessed value per pupil and whether school districts with lower
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assessed value per pupil had to levy higher tax rates to have the same spending per pupil. The answer to
both questions was clearly affirmative, and the Superior Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
If the Supreme Court had asked the Superior Court to examine the link between individual wealth
and district wealth, the outcome may have been different. That examination would have been difficult at
the time because Census data was not aggregated to the school district level. The Census Bureau
completed that task in the late 1970s, however, allowing us now to examine the evidence.2 Our
framework for doing so is a simplified version of the median voter model due to Borcherding and Deacon
(1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). A family’s demand for school spending is a function of its
income and its tax-price for school spending. The tax-price is the increase in the family’s property taxes
if the school district increases property tax revenue by one dollar per pupil. That tax-price equals the
assessed value of the family’s home divided by the district’s assessed value per pupil. In logarithmic
terms, this price is p=h-v, where h is the log of the family’s assessed value and v is the log of the district’s
assessed value per pupil. Assume that the assessed value of a family’s house is determined by its income,

h = h0 + θy , where y is the log of the family’s income and θ is the income elasticity of housing demand.
Assume further that a family’s demand function for spending per pupil has constant price and income
elasticities, s = s 0 + εp + ηy , where s is the log of the demand for spending per pupil, ε is the price
elasticity of demand and η is the income elasticity of demand. Combining the previous three equations,
the demand for spending per pupil is s = β 0 + β1v + β 2 y , where β 0 = s 0 + εh0 , β1 = −ε , and

β 2 = (εθ + η ) . With the assumptions that spending per pupil in a district equals the demand of the
median voter and that the median voter has median income, this demand function leads to the regression
reported in Table 1.
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Table 1
Coefficient Estimates for Median Voter Regressions, 1969-70
Dependent Variable: Log of Spending Per Pupil (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Coefficient (variable)
β1 (log of assessed value per pupil)

Elementary
Districts
0.171
(0.013)

High School
Districts
0.265
(0.025)

Unified
Districts
0.267
(0.015)

β 2 (log of median family income)

0.137
(0.029)

0.002
(0.043)

0.035
(0.033)

401
0.346

110
0.508

228
0.569

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

The model in Table 1 excludes several important factors. For example, it ignores the fact that
renters may face a different tax-price than homeowners (Oates (2005)) and that parents with children in
private school may have different demands for public school spending than parents with children in
public schools (Sonstelie (1982)). Yet, despite these omissions, the model explains more than 30 percent
of the variation in spending per pupil for elementary districts and more than 50 percent for high school
and unified districts. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are consistent with expectations. The
coefficient β1 should be positive because it is the negative of the price elasticity of demand. The
coefficient is positive and more than ten times its standard error in all three regressions. The coefficient

β 2 is a function of the price elasticity of the demand for school spending, ε, the income elasticity of the
demand for spending, η, and the income elasticity of housing demand, θ. Specifically, β 2 = (εθ + η ) .
Because both income elasticities should be positive and the price elasticity negative, β 2 could be positive
or negative. In fact, as Table 1 shows, the coefficient is positive for all three types of districts, but not
significantly different from zero for high school and unified districts.
The insignificant coefficients on median family income seem to suggest that income had little
effect on spending per pupil, at least for high school and unified districts. That is, two districts with the
same assessed value per pupil but different levels of median family income had roughly the same
spending per pupil. While this is strictly true, the qualification about assessed value is important.
Because housing is a normal good, the assessed value per pupil of residential property should rise with
family income. If two districts had the same assessed values but different incomes, the lower income
district must therefore have had either more non-residential property per pupil or fewer students per

6

family. Either factor would lower the district’s tax price and thus offset the negative effect on demand of
its lower income.
The critical relationship between income and assessed value is best illustrated with a simple
example. Suppose that all property is residential and all districts have the same number of students per
family. Then, assessed value per pupil would be roughly proportional to median family income, the taxprice of education would be approximately the same for all districts, and spending per pupil would
primarily be a function of family income. The two variables in our median voter regressions would be
nearly collinear, making it difficult to estimate their coefficients. A simple regression of spending per
pupil on median family income would work very well, however. Most importantly, in this world, the
complaint of the Serrano lawyers would have been exactly right. The quality of public schools, as
measured by revenue per pupil, would have been determined almost solely by family income.
This example points to the critical role of the correlation between the log of median family
income and the log of assessed value per pupil. In the example of the previous paragraph, that correlation
is close to unity. Among California school districts in 1969-70, the correlation was far short of unity. For
elementary districts, it was 0.12. For unified districts, it was only 0.04, and for high school districts it was
actually negative, -0.05.
These low correlations of median family income and assessed value per pupil could be due to two
basic factors. The first is variations in students per family. As Fischel (2004) pointed out in his analysis
of voting patterns on Proposition 13, districts with many senior citizens had relatively high assessed value
per pupil because they had fewer students per family. A second factor is the distribution of nonresidential property. While we do not know the value of non-residential property in each school district,
assessed values for California's largest school districts seem consistent with an uneven distribution of
non-residential property. Among the largest ten school districts, San Juan and Garden Grove, both
middle-income suburban districts with little commercial or industrial property, had the lowest assessed
value per pupil (less than $7,000 per pupil). On the other hand, Oakland, Long Beach, and San Francisco,
central cities with large amounts of industrial and commercial property had assessed values greater than
$15,000 per pupil.
Both of these factors, variations in non-residential property and students per family, surely
explain some of the variation in assessed value per pupil across districts. The question is whether they
can explain the unexpectedly low correlation between median family income and assessed value per
pupil. In particular, did the distributions of either variable across districts offset what we presume to be a
strongly positive correlation between median family income and the average value of residences? In the
case of students per family, the correlation with median family income would have had to have been
strongly positive. In fact, the correlation between the logs of those two variables was very small for
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unified districts (0.01) and negative for elementary and high school districts (-0.21 and -0.04). The
distribution of students per family was not the explanation of the low correlation between median family
income and assessed value per pupil.
This finding leaves the distribution of non-residential property as a possible explanation.
Evidence in favor of this explanation is the low correlation between median family income and assessed
value per family. That is, when total assessed value, residential and non-residential, is normalized by
families instead of students, the correlation with median family income is low. For unified districts, the
correlation was 0.05, for elementary districts -0.21, and for high school districts -0.04. If total assessed
value per family is not correlated with median family income, a negative relationship between nonresidential property per family and family income must have offset the almost certainly positive
relationship between assessed values of houses and the income of their residents.
Whatever the explanation, because assessed value per pupil was not strongly correlated with
median family income in a district, high-income districts faced, on average, higher tax-price for public
school spending. The higher tax price partially offset the direct effect of income on demand for public
school spending resulting in a weak relationship between spending per pupil and family income. In 196970, the correlation of the log of spending per pupil to the log of median family income was 0.26 for
elementary districts, 0.07 for unified districts, and -0.05 for high school districts. In the Appendix, the
correlation of median family income and spending per pupil is expressed as a function of the correlation
of median family income and assessed value per pupil, providing a mathematical representation of the
intuition we have presented for this result.
This focus on median income is revealing; and, if California school districts were very
homogeneous with respect to family income as the Tiebout model suggests, it would be all there is to say.
In fact, however, districts were not homogeneous, and the variation in family income within school
districts was also part of the story. To incorporate this variation, we determined the distribution of
spending per pupil by income class. We took families in specific income ranges and attached to each the
spending per pupil in the school district in which it lived. We then determined the percentage of families
in each income class that lived in districts with less than a certain level of spending per pupil. By making
these calculations, we trace out the distribution of spending per pupil for each income class. The results
are displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Distribution of Total Revenue per Pupil by Income Class, 1969-70,
Percentage of Families in Income Class with Less Revenue per Pupil in their District*

Family Income
$0-2,999
$3,000-5,999
$6,000-7,999
$8,000-9,999
$10,000-11,999
$12,000-14,999
$15,000-24,999
$25,000 & above

Family Income
$0-2,999
$3,000-5,999
$6,000-7,999
$8,000-9,999
$10,000-11,999
$12,000-14,999
$15,000-24,999
$25,000 & above

$600
7.8%
8.0
6.9
5.7
4.9
4.3
4.0
4.8

Elementary Districts
Revenue per Pupil
$700
$800
50.8%
78.7%
50.7
79.0
50.4
79.4
50.1
78.4
49.4
77.5
48.6
76.2
45.0
71.7
37.7
61.6

$900
91.3%
91.1
91.1
91.0
90.8
90.1
87.4
79.1

$1,000
94.7%
94.8
94.5
94.3
94.3
94.0
92.6
87.8

$800
11.6%
11.3
13.0
13.8
13.9
14.4
13.6
10.3

High School Districts
Revenue per Pupil
$900
$1000
29.8%
70.5%
29.2
70.7
30.1
69.7
31.9
69.4
31.3
68.3
30.9
67.5
28.6
63.7
22.3
55.4

$1100
85.2%
85.5
84.5
83.6
82.7
81.9
79.8
75.1

$1200
89.6%
90.9
89.2
88.6
88.1
87.5
85.2
79.0

$1,000
89.8%
90.8
90.8
91.5
91.6
91.5
90.6
86.8

$1,100
91.7%
92.7
92.6
93.1
93.2
93.2
92.5
89.6

Unified School Districts
Revenue per Pupil
Family Income
$700
$800
$900
$0-2,999
6.9%
34.3%
80.7%
$3,000-5,999
7.4
36.7
82.2
$6,000-7,999
7.9
37.5
82.2
$8,000-9,999
9.4
39.7
82.6
$10,000-11,999
10.2
40.5
83.0
$12,000-14,999
9.9
40.1
83.0
$15,000-24,999
9.0
37.0
81.9
$25,000 & above
5.4
26.9
77.7
*Source: Controller’s Annual Report and 1970 Census

The distribution of spending per pupil is quite similar across income classes. For example, for
families in unified districts with incomes over $25,000, 77.7 percent lived in districts with revenue per
pupil less than $900. In comparison, for families with incomes between $10,000 and $12,000, 83.0
percent lived in districts with revenue per pupil below $900, a very slight difference. Similar
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comparisons hold true for other income groups and other types of districts. High income families in
elementary districts fare considerably better than other income groups in those districts, but the
differences are still quite small.
Part of the explanation for the similarities displayed in Table 2 is the low correlation between
median family income and spending per pupil. Even if the distribution of income differed widely across
districts, the distribution of spending per pupil by income group would be quite similar if higher income
districts did not tend to have significantly different levels of spending. But that is only part of the
explanation. The second part is the similarity of the income distribution across communities. To take the
extreme case, if the distribution of family income were the same in every district, the distribution of
spending per pupil would be the same across income groups, regardless of the distribution of spending per
pupil across districts. More generally, if there were more variation of family income within districts than
across districts, the distribution of spending per pupil would be similar across income groups. In fact,
most of the variation was within districts. For elementary school districts, 90 percent of the variance in
family income was due to variance within districts. This portion was even larger for unified and high
school districts.
2. Revenue Limits, Proposition 13, and the Transformation from Local to State Finance
Though the facts about spending, assessed value, and income were never thoroughly examined by
the courts, they began to come to light as the legislature attempted to fashion a response to the Serrano
ruling. At first, the legislature focused on equalizing spending per pupil across districts by establishing a
system of revenue limits for districts. A district’s revenue limit was a cap of the sum of its local property
taxes and its state non-categorical aid. Each district’s revenue limit was based on its revenue per pupil in
1972-73 and then increased annually from that base with the limits of low-spending districts increasing at
a faster rate than the limits of high-spending districts. In addition, to encourage them to reach their limits,
the legislature increased state aid to low-spending districts. Over time, this increase in state aid in
combination with the convergence in revenue limits would cause revenue per pupil to converge across
districts.
The limits on high-spending districts were politically unpopular, particularly because several
large, urban districts were high-spending districts. Not only were these districts well represented in the
legislature, they also had large percentages of disadvantaged students and could thus argue that they
required higher revenue to meet the educational needs of their students. In response to these arguments,
the legislature established a categorical program, Education for Disadvantaged Youth, that directed
additional state funds to large urban districts. The legislature has continued this pattern to the present,
using categorical programs to address special needs and to respond to politically powerful districts. In
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fact, the school finance model crafted in response to the first Serrano ruling remains in place today.
Revenue limits determine the bulk of district revenue, and categorical revenue is added to that base.
The legislature’s response to the Serrano ruling did not satisfy the Los Angeles Superior Court.
The equalization of revenue limits would take too long, and school districts constrained by the limits had
a ready escape. They could override their limits with a simple majority vote of their residents. Because
almost all California school districts had been regularly passing levy elections before Serrano, the
override provision eviscerated the revenue limit system.
The Court’s rejection of this system caused the legislature to attempt a more ambitious reform. It
kept revenue limits and the override provision, but subjected overrides to power equalization. For
districts with low assessed value per pupil, the state would supplement their tax revenue from an override
so that every school district would receive the same revenue from the same increase in property tax rates.
This additional aid would be costly to the state, but it had a surplus at the time, which many legislators
were earmarking for a solution to the Serrano ruling.
Power equalization was never implemented. Less than a month before it was slated to begin, the
voters of California passed Proposition 13, which set a one-percent limit on the property tax rate and gave
to the legislature the authority to allocate the revenue from that rate among local governments. The
legislature based its allocations on historical patterns; but, because the one-percent rate was less than half
of the average rate before Proposition 13, those allocations fell far short of what governments had
previously received. To compensate, the state increased aid to local governments, using the surplus it had
accumulated. For school districts, state aid was determined by revenue limits. Each district’s aid was the
difference between its revenue limit and the property tax revenue it was allocated.3 In other words, each
district’s revenue limit was the revenue per pupil it received from the property tax and state aid. In that
sense, the state now determines each district’s revenue.
Fischel (1989, 1996, 2001, 2004) has argued that the Serrano ruling caused Proposition 13.
Faced with the prospect of losing control of their property tax revenue, homeowners voted to limit it. As
evidence of his explanation, Fischel pointed out that voter had earlier rejected ballot initiatives to limit the
property tax and to shift the financing of public schools towards the state. Only after the Serrano ruling
placed the nexus between their taxes and their schools in jeopardy, Fischel argued, did voters change their
minds and decide to limit property taxes. In any event, Proposition 13 did provide the legislature with a
relatively straightforward response to the Serrano ruling. It made the property tax a state tax and ended
what remained after Serrano of the local finance of public education.
Since Proposition 13, the legislature has gradually equalized revenue limits and thus revenue per
pupil. In 1986, the Los Angeles Superior Court found that this equalization had gone far enough to
satisfy the Serrano ruling. The legislature has continued to equalize revenue, however, by periodically

11

bringing up the revenue limits of districts below the average. By 1999-2000, these differences were quite
small. In unified districts, 25 percent of students were enrolled in districts with revenue limit funds
greater than $3,901 per pupil, and 25 percent of students were enrolled in districts with revenue limit
funds less than $3,806. The gap between the 75th and 25th percentile was only 2 percent. For the 95th and
5th percentile, the gap was 11 percent. In contrast, the equivalent gaps for 1969-70 were 14 percent and
70 percent.
State categorical programs have continued to grow. In 1999-2000, these programs constituted 25
percent of the revenue of unified districts, 22 percent of the revenue of elementary districts, and 18
percent of the revenue of high school districts. The legislature has also allowed districts to levy a tax on
parcels of real property. We discuss this tax in more detail below.
State and federal categorical programs widen the disparities in revenue per pupil. In general,
however, these disparities favor districts with high proportions of disadvantaged students. For example,
for total revenue per pupil in unified districts in 1999-2000, the gap between the 75th and 25th percentile is
$962, much higher than the $95 gap in revenue limit funds. A simple regression of revenue per pupil on
the percentage of low-income students (measured by eligibility for the free or reduced-price lunch
program) reveals that most of that gap can be explained by categorical revenue favoring low-income
students. For unified districts in 1999-2000, a low-income student yielded about $1,018 more revenue
than other students. For an elementary school district, this increment was $451, and for a high school
district, the increment was actually negative, specifically -$301. There are large variations around these
averages, however.
Though the finance of public schools has been centralized, the governance of those schools is still
a local function. Local voters still elect school boards for their districts, and the school boards hire and
fire top management, approve school district budgets, and set district policies. Each school district
bargains with its employee unions over salaries, benefits, and working conditions, though the parameters
for that bargaining are established by the budget decisions made in Sacramento. A key issue, of course, is
the total revenue provided to schools. For collective bargaining, another important issue is the division of
that total revenue between unrestricted revenue and categorical revenue. Unrestricted revenue funds
salaries; categorical revenue is often protected from collective bargaining. For those reasons, the
employee unions are active lobbyists in Sacramento, fighting to increase the flow of unrestricted revenue
and thus the pool of money available for salary increases for their members. On the other hand, some
categorical programs such as the large K-3 Class Size Reduction program were motivated at least partly
by the desire to limit those salary increases. As a consequence, the legislature’s decisions about how
much district revenue to make unrestricted and how much to tie up in categorical programs are the first
round of collective bargaining between districts and their employee unions.
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Figure 1
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The legislature has not been particularly generous with its public schools. From 1969-70 to 19992000, spending per pupil in California fell about 22 percent relative to spending per pupil in all other
states (Figure 1). In 1969-70, spending per pupil in California was 12 percent higher than in other states.
It was actually 16 percent higher in 1977-78, the year before Proposition 13. This margin fell to 9 percent
the next year and continued to decline in subsequent years. California’s spending per pupil reached a
relative low in 1994-95, 15 percent below the level of other states. It recovered slightly to 10 percent
below other states by 1999-2000.
This 10 percent gap understates the gap in resources. In 1999-2000, the teacher-pupil ratio in
California was 26 percent lower than the ratio in other states. The gap in resources is larger than the gap
in spending per pupil because California teachers were paid about 16 percent more than teachers in other
states. The strong teachers’ unions in California explain some of the difference in teachers’ salaries, but
the 16 percent premium is not far out of line with other salary differences. In 1999-2000, employees with
bachelor’s degrees earned about 14 percent more in California than in the rest of the country (Rose and
others (2003)).
Since Serrano, courts have overturned school finance systems in several other states. California’s
relative decline in spending per pupil is not a general trend among these states. Manwaring and Sheffrin
(1997) compare public school spending in states with court-order reform to spending in other states.
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Using a dynamic model that allows for lagged adjustment to reform and for the effect of reform to depend
on a variety of state characteristics, they find that the expenditures of some states are higher than they
would have been without reform while expenditures in others are lower. Downes and Shah (1995) use a
similar approach and reach a similar conclusion. Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) examine this issue
at the school district level, revealing the effect of reform not just on average spending per pupil in a state
but also on the distribution of spending per pupil across districts. They find that court-order reform
tended to level up spending per pupil within a state. It raised expenditures in low-spending districts and
had no effect on high-spending districts. Aware of the inconsistency of their results with California’s
experience, they re-estimated their model without California districts and found that omitting these
districts increased the positive effect of reform on expenditures. They attributed California’s exceptional
response to court-ordered reform to the strict revenue equality demanded by California’s courts, though
they did not explain why revenue equality necessarily leads to a leveling down.
One possible explanation of California exceptional response is simply that it was first. Before the
Serrano ruling, state legislatures could not have reasonably anticipated that the courts would overturn
their school finance systems. After the Serrano ruling, however, many state legislatures began to
examine their own liabilities and to reform their school finance systems. As a consequence, it is not quite
so clear that the world can be neatly divided into states that reformed their systems after a court order and
states that did not. Among both classes are surely some states that reformed their systems in an attempt to
thwart a court order to do so.
Another possible explanation of California’s exceptional response is that its school finance
reform was accompanied by a property tax limitation. As we have noted above, Fischel has argued that
Serrano caused Proposition 13, an argument that would disqualify property tax limitations as an
independent explanation. But several states had tax limitations without court-ordered reform, providing
an opportunity to separate the effects of tax limitations from the effects of court-ordered reform. Figlio
(1997) demonstrated the promise of that explanation by showing that, after enacting limits, states
increased student-teacher ratios and decreased teacher salaries. As further evidence of this negative
effect, Figlio and Rueben (2001) showed that states with property tax limits experienced a reduction in
the average quality of new public school teachers.
Though these studies do not identify the mechanism through which a property tax limitation
affects public school quality, the mechanism seems obvious. The limit reduces property tax revenue,
which reduces funds for public schools and thus public school quality. But, lower property tax revenue
can be replaced by other taxes or by increased aid to local governments from the state. In fact, California
followed exactly this path. Despite the limit on the property tax rate, in 1999-2000 state and local
governments in California spent 9 percent more per capita than governments in other states. Thus,
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California’s relatively low public school spending cannot be explained by a generally low level of public
expenditures. In an accounting sense, California’s low public school spending is due to two factors.
First, it had about 8 percent more pupils per capita than other states. Second, despite the first factor, the
state allocated a lower share of public funds to schools than other states. In California in 1999-2000, the
expenditures of public schools constituted 22 percent of state and local public expenditures. In the rest of
the country, this share was 24.6 percent. California’s relative decline in spending per pupil does not
reflect a general decline in the public sector but rather a choice about the allocation of a relatively
abundant stream of state and local revenue.
Another explanation for California’s relative decline in spending per pupil focuses on how school
finance reform changed the tax-price of school spending. In response to court orders, other states
implemented district power equalization and other financing schemes that alter the tax-price for school
district spending, but left districts with some authority over their own property tax rates. California took
away from school districts the authority to tax property, which, from the perspective of school districts,
made the property tax-price infinite. Hoxby (1999) determined how school finance reforms altered taxprices for districts and then estimated how spending per pupil in districts responded to those changes in
tax-prices. The tax-price in her analysis is the increase in district property tax revenue required to
increase spending by one dollar. Before Serrano in California, this price was unity; after Serrano, it is
infinite. Hoxby estimates than an increase in tax-price from unity to infinity decreases spending per pupil
by 15 percent, thus explaining most of California’s relative decline.4
This explanation is misleading, however, because it implicitly assumes that school spending
decisions in California are made at the school district level. As we show in what follows, some limited
school spending decisions are made at the school district level through parcel tax elections. However, the
most important spending decisions are made by the legislature when it decides whether to increase
revenue limit funding and categorical programs. At that level, the tax-price of school spending is
certainly not infinite. School spending can be increased by increasing income or sales tax rates or by
decreasing expenditures in other areas. Of course, legislatures in other states make similar decisions
when they decide to increase foundation or equalization aid. What distinguishes California from those
other states is the balance between state and local decisions. Almost all the spending decisions that count
in California are made by the state legislature. Virtually none are made locally.
Picus (1991) focused directly on this issue, arguing that the indirect link between taxpayers and
their local public schools has caused California’s relative decline in school spending. Homeowners pay
property, sales, and income taxes, which are then blended in Sacramento and returned to their local public
schools. Compared to the days before Serrano in which they could simply vote to increase their property
tax rates, taxpayers and families have no simple way to affect the funds of their local public schools. It is
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less clear why this should lead to lower spending on schools, however, because school districts and
teachers’ unions are very well represented in Sacramento.
Silva and Sonstelie (1995) propose another explanation which is also based on the change in the
level of government at which educational spending decisions are made. If the demand for education is
determined by family income and families are partitioned among school districts according to their
income as the Tiebout model suggests, the statewide average of spending per pupil should approximately
equal the average demand, which is then the demand of a family with average income. Under state
finance, however, average spending per pupil, which will be the same in every district, should reflect the
demands of the median voter, which is the demand of the family with median income. Because average
income is greater than median income, the average of spending per pupil under local finance will be
greater than spending per pupil under state finance. With this explanation, Silva and Sonstelie can
explain about half of California’s decline in spending per pupil. The difficulty with this explanation,
however, is that school districts in California were not homogeneous with respect to family income. In
1970, there was much more variation of family income within school districts than across districts.
Furthermore, non-residential property was inversely correlated with median family income, and thus
many school districts with low median income had high spending per pupil.
A related explanation was offered by Fernandez and Rogerson (1999), who incorporate the
foundation aid system that California had in 1970. Under that system, low-income school districts find it
cheaper to increase their spending by increasing the foundation than by increasing their own taxes. They
thus support a relatively high foundation level, which higher-income districts supplement with their own
taxes. The result is a higher level of spending than if all districts are required to have the same level of
spending, as under state finance. Like Silva and Sonstelie, this explanation depends on the unrealistic
assumption that school districts are homogeneous with respect to family income and that all property was
residential. In addition, it has the unrealistic implication that many school districts do not supplement
state foundation aid. In fact, as related above, all but 11 California school districts in 1970 voted in favor
of property tax rates exceeding the statutory maximum, and every California school in 1968-69
supplemented its foundation aid by at least $130 per pupil.
A fourth explanation is directly related to the median voter model in Table 1. In 1969-70, the
property tax was the source of marginal funds for school districts. For a homeowner, the tax-price of
spending per pupil was its assessed value divided by the assessed value per pupil in its school district.
For the state as a whole, non-residential property made up 45 percent of that total (Sonstelie, Brunner, and
Ardon (2000)). Thus, on average, homeowners received a 45 percent subsidy for school spending.
Proposition 13 put a strict lid on property tax revenue, and so the source of marginal funds for schools
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became the income and sales taxes. Both sources tax individuals directly with very small percentages
paid by business. Thus, Proposition 13 increased the tax-price of school spending by about 45 percent.
The effect of this price increase is determined by the price elasticity of demand, which is the
negative of the coefficient on assessed value per pupil in the simple median voter model in Table 1. That
number is probably an underestimate, however. Spending per pupil was positively correlated with state
aid, which was negatively correlated with assessed value per pupil. Thus, our estimate of the price
elasticity is biased towards zero. Because of the flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler (1995)), state aid may
have had a relatively large effect on school district spending, making this bias quite large. In any event,
our estimate of the price elasticity is -0.171 for elementary districts, -0.265 for high school districts, and
-0.267 for unified districts. Based on that evidence and the likelihood that the price elasticity is lower
than our estimates, let us suppose that the price elasticity was -0.25. A 45 percent increase in the taxprice of spending per pupil would then entail an 11 percent reduction in spending per pupil, which would
explain about half the relative reduction California experienced.
If this explanation has validity, it only raises another question. Why doesn’t California find
another tax source to fund its schools, a source with the same subsidies from business? In fact, some
school districts appear to be groping towards that solution as they refine their implementation of the
parcel tax. These refinements are discussed in Section 3.
If school resources affect student achievement, California’s relative decline in resources per pupil
should be reflected in a relative decline in student achievement. This appears to have occurred. During
the 1990s, California students performed poorly on the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), a standardized test in writing and mathematics administered to a sample of fourth and eighth
graders throughout the country. This poor performance partly reflects the large percentage of immigrant
students in the state, but even when corrections are made for family characteristics, California students
are well below students in other states. As reported in Carroll and others (2005), for the battery of NAEP
tests administered between 1990 and 2003, California students scored 0.18 standard deviations below the
national mean after adjusting for family characteristics. California’s average adjusted score was the
lowest of any state participating in the NAEP.
California students performed considerably better in the period before the transformation from
local to state finance. The first piece of evidence comes from the National Longitudinal Study of the
High School Class of 1972 (NLS). The study administered a standardized test to a sample of high school
seniors in 1972 and also collected information about the characteristics of their families, including race,
ethnicity, family income, and parental education. Using that data, Sonstelie, Brunner, and Ardon (2000)
regressed test scores on family characteristics and a dummy variable indicating whether the student was a
California resident. The coefficient on that dummy variable was not significantly different from zero. A
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similar regression produced the same result with data from High School and Beyond (HSB). The HSB
test was administrated to tenth and twelfth graders in 1980, two years after the transformation from local
to state finance. However, the students taking the test would have received most of their education before
the transformation.
This apparent decline in average performance would be less troubling if it were accompanied by
an equalization of achievement across districts and income groups. There is little evidence of
equalization across school districts, however. Downes (1992) examined district averages on a statemandated achievement test. The distribution of district scores is very similar in 1976-77 and 1985-86.
Moreover, in school districts with low spending per pupil in 1976-77, and thus relatively large increases
in spending from 1976-77 to 1985-86, student achievement did not rise faster than in other districts.
There is less evidence about the equalization of achievement across income groups. Because of
the growing number of categorical programs, school districts with high proportions of low-income
students do tend to receive more revenue per pupil. Yet, schools serving primarily low-income students
have considerably lower scores on state-mandated achievement tests than do other schools. California
now has a battery of achievement tests, which are aggregated into an Academic Performance Index (API)
for each school. Figure 2 shows the API for California elementary schools plotted against the percentage
of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. This percentage and the API number are
averages for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. As the figure shows, the majority of schools in low-poverty
neighborhoods achieved an 800 API, which is the state’s goal for each school. However, very few
achieved that goal in high-poverty neighborhoods. In fact, among the 752 elementary schools that have
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90 percent or more of their students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, none had an average API
exceeding 800, and only 18 had an average exceeding 700. In contrast, among the 584 elementary
schools with 10 percent or fewer of their students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, all but 36 had
an API exceeding 800. We do not have comparable data for the period before California’s school finance
reform, so we cannot determine whether the data displayed in Figure 2 represents an improvement. If it is
indeed an improvement, it must be a modest one.
Three other studies put these California results in national perspective. Downes and Figlio (1997)
examined student achievement on the NLS of 1972 and the National Educational Longitudinal Study
(NELS) of 1992 and found that states that enacted tax or expenditures limitations experienced a
significant drop in student achievement. However, court-ordered reform did not have a significant effect
on student achievement, echoing the findings of Figlio (1997) concerning the effect on spending of tax
limitations and finance reforms. Limitations have an effect, but reform by itself does not. These results
suggest that California’s decline in student achievement was due to its particular approach to school
finance reform. Husted and Kenny (2000) focus on how different approaches to school finance reform
affected student achievement. They measured reform by the extent to which a state has equalized
spending per pupil across districts, the one measure by which California’s reform ranks near the top.
Using SAT scores from 1987 to 1992 as a measure of achievement, they found that average achievement
was lower in states than had equalized spending. Furthermore, they also found that equalization had no
effect on the disparity in student achievement within a state.
Card and Payne (2002) also investigate SAT scores but use a different measure of school finance
reform. For each state, they estimate the relationship across school districts between median family
income and spending per pupil. Court-ordered reform tends to flatten that gradient, and states that have
flattened their gradients have also narrowed the gap between the SAT scores of students from highly and
poorly educated families. The effects are relatively small, however. The estimated reductions are for
SAT scores in 1990 through 1992 compared to scores in 1978 through 1980. For the 12 states that
implemented a court-ordered reform during this period, the achievement gap was reduced by about 5
percent. California was not one of those states, and we do not know whether the SAT achievement gap in
California narrowed in the 1980s.
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Table 3
Percentage of School Children Enrolled in Private Schools by Family Income Deciles
1970
Income Decile

CA

Lowest
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Highest

3.8%
4.4
4.8
5.5
8.5
9.2
9.3
10.3
10.7
13.1

U.S.
Except CA
4.8%
6.0
7.3
10.3
11.8
12.9
13.6
14.7
16.1
19.8

1980
CA
5.5%
6.7
7.3
7.7
9.1
10.6
10.5
13.7
12.8
17.2

U.S.
Except CA
5.4%
6.3
7.9
9.1
10.2
10.8
11.4
12.8
14.0
19.9

1990
CA
4.2%
3.7
5.2
6.3
9.1
8.5
10.3
13.5
14.4
20.8

U.S.
Except CA
3.6%
5.1
6.5
8.2
9.0
9.5
10.7
12.4
14.5
21.3

2000
CA

U.S.
Except CA

3.6%
4.0
4.5
5.9
7.0
8.6
10.1
12.2
15.0
22.6

4.8%
5.6
7.0
7.9
8.9
9.7
10.9
12.3
14.5
21.9

3. Responses to Reform
The transformation described in the previous section affected the educational opportunities
perceived by California families. After the transformation to state finance, public school resources were
much more equally distributed across school districts, but lower on average than districts in other states.
As a consequence, for many California families, local public schools must have had fewer resources than
they were willing to pay for. How have these families responded to this gap between their demand and
the opportunities presented by the public sector? One possible response is private schooling. Another
response is to supplement the public school resources provided by the state through either voluntary
contributions or by enacting a local parcel tax. In this section we examine the magnitude of each of these
responses.
Private School Enrollments
We examine trends in private school enrollment using data on families with school-age children
from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). For each year, we
assigned families to deciles based on their annual income and then calculated the percentage of students
enrolled in private school in each income decile. Table 3 shows the results of that exercise.5
Private school enrollment has increased among higher-income families. For example, among
children from families in the highest income decile, 13.1 percent attended private school in California in
1970, 17.2 percent in 1980, 20.8 percent in 1990, and 22.6 percent in 2000. A similar pattern of rising
private school enrollments in California holds for children from families in the eighth and ninth deciles.
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Furthermore, among the top three income deciles, a considerably lower percentage of California students
were enrolled in private school in 1970 than in the rest of the country. By 2000, however, private school
enrollment rates among high-income families in California had reached the rate for similar families in
other parts of the nation.
Factors other than school finance reform have undoubtedly contributed to the rise in private
school enrollment among high-income families in California. For example, Betts and Fairlie (2003) use
PUMS data from 132 metropolitan areas in 1980 and 1990 to examine the impact of immigration on
propensity of native-born families to send their children to private school. Their results suggest that
private school enrollment tended to rise in areas that experienced inflows of immigrant children. Over the
last three decades, California has certainly experienced large immigrant inflows suggesting that some of
the rise in private school enrollment is due to its effect. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude
that at least part of the increase in private school enrollment was due to school finance reform.
Several recent studies provide evidence consistent with that notion. Using district-level data from
California in 1970 and 1980, Downes and Schoeman (1998) found that private school enrollment rose in
districts that experienced a decline in real spending per pupil over the same time period. They concluded
that roughly half of the rise in private school enrollment in California between 1970 and 1980 could be
directly attributed to school finance reform. Similarly, Husted and Kenny (2002) examined changes in
private school enrollment in 159 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 1970, 1980, and 1990. They
found that private school enrollments tended to rise in MSAs located in states that adopted policies
designed to equalize spending per pupil. Furthermore, their results suggest that the leveling of school
spending had a particularly large effect on private school enrollments in high-income MSAs.
These studies suggest that at least part of the rise in private school enrollment in California was a
direct response to school finance reform. Nevertheless, it still seems surprising that more families did not
opt out of the public sector. Nechyba (2003a, 2003b), provides an explanation for this moderate response.
In his analysis, school finance centralization and spending equalization have two distinct effects on
private school enrollment. First, while equalization causes spending per pupil to fall in some districts, it
also causes spending per pupil to rise in other districts. As a result, while private school enrollment rates
may rise in previously high-spending districts, they may fall in previously low-spending districts.
Second, when public schools are financed at the local level with property tax revenues, families wishing
to send their child to private school have an incentive to reside in low-quality/low-spending districts to
take advantage of lower housing prices and to reduce their tax burdens. In contrast, when public schools
are financed at the state level with statewide income tax revenues, families can no longer reduce their tax
burdens by living in a low-quality/low-spending district. Consequently, school finance centralization
increases the opportunity cost of living in a low-quality district and sending a child to private school. As
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a result, some families that previously chose to send their child to private school and live in a low-quality
district may now choose to move to a high-quality district (those with high student peer quality) and send
their child to public school. Simulations conducted by Nechyba suggest that this secondary effect of
school finance centralization may be quite significant.
Voluntary Contributions
While school finance reform may not have engendered a dramatic increase in private school
enrollments, it did provoke another response. In the aftermath of school finance reform, many districts
established educational foundations to channel private contributions into public schools. Prior to 1970
there were fewer than 10 of these organizations operating in California. There are now more than 500. In
addition, over the last several decades Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and booster clubs have
become much more active in raising private contributions to supplement local school budgets. To
examine how successful schools and school districts have been at raising voluntary contributions, we used
data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Master Business File to identify the contributions raised by all
nonprofit organizations that supported either an individual school or a school district in California in
2001.6 At the school level, contributions are raised primarily by PTA’s and booster clubs. At the district
level, contributions are raised primarily by local educational foundations.
As Table 4 demonstrates, a number of schools and school districts have been quite successful in
raising voluntary contributions. For example, 36 schools had contributions per pupil in excess of $500 in
2001, and among those schools the average contribution per pupil was $805. Similarly, 12 districts had
contributions per pupil in excess of $500 and among those districts the average contribution per pupil was
$1,776. As the fourth column demonstrates, the schools and school districts that were most successful in
raising voluntary contributions were populated by the highest income families.7 Family income averaged
$223,759 in the 12 districts with contributions per pupil in excess of $500. In contrast it averaged only
$68,690 in the 63 districts with contributions per pupil of less than $10.
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Table 4
Characteristics of Schools and Districts with Voluntary Contributions in 2001

Number of
Average
Average
Schools/
Contribution
Family
Average
School Districts Per Pupil
Income
Enrollment
Contributions to Schools
Less than $10
45
$ 5
$ 70,342
1,754
$10 - $24
214
18
72,981
1,216
$25 - $49
450
37
78,132
918
$50 - $99
494
71
89,704
771
$100 - $249
353
154
112,086
777
$250 - $499
97
338
150,927
665
$500 and above
36
805
185,374
549
Contributions to Districts
Less than $10
63
$
5
$ 68,690
20,415
$10 - $24
29
17
81,003
12,643
$25 - $49
20
36
81,881
4,408
$50 - $99
26
79
90,586
4,633
$100 - $249
25
164
123,207
4,903
$250 - $499
16
391
155,196
1,623
$500 and above
12
1,776
223,759
660
Note: Contributions to single-school districts are included as contributions
to districts.
Contributions
Per Pupil

Despite the fact that several schools and school districts have been successful at raising voluntary
contributions, overall the use of voluntary contributions is quite limited. In 2001, there were over 8,000
schools operating in California and only 36 of those schools managed to raise more than $500 per pupil.
Similarly, of the 986 districts operating in California in 2001, only 12 managed to raise more than $500
per pupil. California’s wealthiest communities have been the most active in raising voluntary
contributions; but even in those communities, the use of voluntary contributions remains limited.
Brunner and Imazeki (2005) find that even among the 1,425 elementary and middle schools with the
highest average family incomes in 2000, fewer than a quarter of those schools raised more than $100 per
pupil in 2001 and fewer than 2.5 percent raised more than $500 per pupil.
The final column of Table 4, which shows how voluntary contributions varied with school or
school district enrollment, provides a partial explanation for the limited use of voluntary contributions.
At both the school and school district level, contributions per pupil tend to decline with enrollment. For
example, the average enrollment in schools with contributions per pupil in excess of $500 is only 549
students. In contrast, the average enrollment in schools with contributions of $10 or less is 1,754
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students. The inverse relationship between school size and contributions per pupil alludes to an important
limitation schools and school districts face when attempting to replace lost property tax revenue with
voluntary contributions. Property tax payments are mandatory, contributions are voluntary. That
distinction is particularly important given the public good nature of voluntary contributions. Once a
family contributes to their local public school, their contribution benefits not only their own child but also
the children of all other families who attend the same school. As a result, it is in the self interest of any
one family not to contribute and free ride off the contributions of other families. Furthermore, as noted by
Sandler (1992) among others, the incentive to free ride tends to increase with the group size. Using data
on voluntary contributions to California’s public schools in 1994, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) find that
a one percent increase in student enrollment leads to a 0.56 percent reduction in contributions per pupil.
Thus, a doubling of school size would lead to a 56 percent decline in contributions per pupil. These
results illustrate an important point: when the source of discretionary revenue is changed from the
property tax to voluntary contributions, the price of school spending is likely to rise since no enforcement
mechanism exists to ensure each family contributes. Thus, even in California’s highest income
communities, the ability to replace lost property tax revenue with voluntary contributions is likely to be
quite limited.
Parcel Taxes
For taxpayers seeking to supplement the revenue of their local public schools, another option is
the parcel tax. Unlike the property tax, the parcel tax is tax on real estate parcels, not the value of those
parcels. Prior to the passage of Proposition 13, the state constitution explicitly prohibited the use of
parcel taxes because it required property to be taxed in proportion to its full value. However, Section 4
of Proposition 13 gave local governments, including school districts, the authority to levy “special taxes”
subject to the approval of two-thirds of the local electorate. Shortly after the passage of Proposition 13
the state legislature successfully argued that parcel taxes were special taxes as long as they were
earmarked for a particular purpose (Doerr (1997)). School districts in California first began placing
parcel tax initiatives on their local ballots in 1983. As of 2005, there have been 369 parcel tax elections
held by school districts and of those elections, 189 were successful.8
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Table 5
Characteristics of Districts with Parcel Taxes in 2003-04

Parcel Tax
Revenue
Per Pupil
Less than $250
$250 - $499
$500 - $749
$750 - $999
$1,000 and above

Number
of School
Districts
17
15
9
3
14

Average
Average
Revenue
Family
Per Pupil
Income
$ 136
$ 79,319
364
133,674
600
179,553
909
168,426
1,536
170,773

Average
Enrollment
7,221
4,289
3,300
1,801
2,034

Table 5 summarizes the size and distribution of parcel tax revenue per pupil in 2003-04. As the
table illustrates, the parcel tax has been used successfully by several districts to raise large sums of
discretionary school revenue. For example, 14 districts managed to raise more than $1,000 per pupil
through the parcel tax, and among those districts parcel tax revenue per pupil averaged $1,536. Two
school districts, Kentfield Elementary and Bolinas-Stinson Union Elementary (both of which are located
in Marin County), levy parcel taxes that raise over $2,000 per pupil. In those districts, parcel tax revenue
accounts for over 20 percent of total school district revenue. Similar to districts that were most successful
in raising voluntary contributions, districts that were most successful in raising revenue through the parcel
tax were populated by families with the highest incomes. In the 14 districts that raised more than $1,000
per pupil through the parcel tax, the average income of families was $170,773. In contrast, in the 17
districts that raised less than $250 per pupil in parcel tax revenue, the average income of families was
only $79,319.
The use of parcel taxes by school districts mirrors the use of voluntary contributions along
another important dimension: overall, usage of the parcel tax remains quite limited. Of the 989 school
districts operating in California in 2004, only 58 levied a parcel tax. Furthermore, among those 58, only
26 managed to raise more than $500 per pupil in parcel tax revenue.
The use of the parcel tax has been limited by two factors. First, to enact a tax, districts must
receive the approval of two-thirds of its voters, a high hurdle. Second, the tax-price of school spending is
considerably higher for the parcel tax than for the property tax. As discussed above, when the source of
discretionary tax revenue is the property tax, the tax-price of school spending is H/(V/S), where S is the
total number of students in a district, H is the assessed value of a family’s home, and V is the total
assessed value of all property in the district. In contrast when the source of discretionary tax revenue is
the parcel tax, the tax price of school spending is 1/(N/S) where N is the total number of parcels within a
district. A comparison of the two tax-prices reveals that, if V/N is greater than H, switching the source of
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discretionary tax revenue from the property tax to the parcel tax increases a family’s tax-price. As it
turns out, the tax-price of school spending does tend to be larger under the parcel tax. Brunner (2001)
compares the tax-price of school spending under the property tax with the tax-price under the parcel tax
for school districts located in Los Angeles County in 2000. His calculations suggest that switching the
source of discretionary school revenue from the property tax to the parcel tax increases the tax-price of
school spending for the average family by approximately 35 percent.
The primary reason for this sharp increase in the tax-price of school spending is related to the
subsidy homeowners receive from non-residential property. With the property tax, the size of the subsidy
depends on the value of non-residential parcels as a percentage of total assessed value. With the parcel
tax, the size of the subsidy depends on the number of non-residential parcels as a percentage of the total
number of parcels. Using data on the value and number of residential and non-residential parcels in four
California counties in 2000, Brunner (2001) found that the subsidy from non-residential property is much
higher under the property tax than it is under the parcel tax.9 For example, homeowners in Los Angeles
County would have received a 34 percent subsidy from non-residential property if the source of
discretionary school revenue were the property tax and only an 11 percent subsidy if the source of
discretionary school revenue were the parcel tax.
For most districts in California, switching the source of discretionary school revenue from the
property tax to the parcel tax led to a large increase in the tax-price of school spending, an increase that
most likely made the parcel tax unappealing to all but the wealthiest districts. In support of that notion,
nearly all districts that have managed to raise significant amounts of revenue through the parcel tax are
located in suburbs and populated by high-income, highly educated, and white families. The one big
exception is Emory Unified, a relatively small, urban school district located in Alameda County with an
average family income of only $43,582 and a student population that is over 98 percent nonwhite.
Despite those facts, the school district raised $1,727 per pupil through the parcel tax in 2003-04. Why has
Emory been so successful in raising supplemental revenue through the parcel tax? The two most
compelling answers to that question are related to the composition of Emory’s property base and the type
of parcel tax utilized by the district. In contrast to most other school districts with parcel taxes, Emory
Unified contains a significant amount of commercial property. Furthermore, unlike most other school
districts, which have imposed parcel taxes on a per-parcel basis, Emory imposes a parcel tax of $0.10 per
square foot of improved property (i.e. structures such as homes, retail shops and factories).10 Because
commercial and industrial property tends to be larger than residential property, under a square footage
parcel tax, the owners of non-residential property pay a larger share of any increase in school spending.
As a result, such a parcel tax restores the subsidy from non-residential property that existed under the
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property tax. In the case of Emory Unified, that subsidy was quite large: approximately 75 percent of
Emory’s parcel tax revenue comes from non-residential property (Smart Voter 2003).
In addition to restoring the subsidy from non-residential property, a parcel tax based on square
footage has another advantage: because parcel size tends to increase with homeowner income, a tax on
the square footage of parcels is less regressive than a fixed dollar tax per parcel of land. In light of these
advantages, it seems natural to ask whether a square footage parcel tax might represent a viable source of
discretionary tax revenue for other districts seeking to supplement their revenues. As noted by Brunner
(2001), the answer to that question depends on whether such a tax would violate the guidelines set forth
by the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest. Recall that the court mandated the state to develop
a school finance system that was fiscally neutral, implying that identical property tax rates should yield
the same revenue per pupil. Unfortunately, a parcel tax based on square footage is unlikely to satisfy the
court’s definition of fiscal neutrality. To illustrate that point, consider two school districts, A and B, that
are identical in every relevant respect (same number of students and the same number of parcels) except
that in district A, each parcel is 1,000 square feet and in the district B each parcel is 2,000 square feet. If
both districts levied the same tax rate per square foot of property, district A would raise only half as much
revenue as district B. As a result, such a tax would most likely violate the court’s interpretation of fiscal
neutrality – identical tax rates would not yield the same revenue per pupil. While the legality of square
footage parcel taxes has not been challenged in court to date, it seems likely that broader use of the square
footage parcel tax could lead to another Serrano-style lawsuit.11
4. School Finance Reform and Support for Private School Vouchers
Private schooling, voluntary contributions, and parcel taxes are local actions, options for
individual families in the case of private schools or for groups of families connected to a school or school
district in the case of contributions and parcel taxes. Californians have also had the opportunity to
respond on a larger scale. In 1993 and then again in 2000, California voters placed private school
voucher initiatives on the statewide ballot, initiatives that would have dramatically overhauled
California’s system of public school finance and increased the range of educational opportunities
available to California families.12 Did families in California view the voucher as a means of undoing
school finance reform?
On one level the answer to that question must surely be negative: both the 1993 and the 2000
voucher initiative lost by approximately a 2 to 1 margin. On another level, however, the answer is less
clear. Approximately two-thirds of all households in California have no school-age children. If those
households tended to vote against the voucher (perhaps due to concern over vouchers fiscal impact) it
could still be that families with children were relatively supportive of the voucher. Furthermore, even
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Table 6
Support for Private School Vouchers by Household Income

Percentage Voting Yes on Voucher Initiative
Household Income
Less than $20,000
$20,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $59,999
$60,000 - $79,999
$80,000 - $99,999
$100,000 of more

Children in Public
School (Obs=1,343)
62.2%
54.2
50.8
51.2
50.9
41.5

No School Children
(Obs=2,923)
53.8%
44.5
40.3
40.5
44.3
42.6

among families with children, one would expect support for the voucher to vary with income. Because
high-income families with children were the group most constrained by school finance reform, they
should be the group most likely to support the voucher.
To examine those possibilities, we used the results of a survey conducted by the Public Policy
Institute of California (PPIC) in the months just prior to California’s 2000 voucher initiative. Between
August and October of 2000, PPIC surveyed approximately 6,000 potential voters concerning issues
related to the November 2000 ballot. The survey asked respondents to report their household income,
whether or not they had children in public school, and how they intended to vote on the voucher
initiative.13 Table 6 shows the results of that survey. The table illustrates how support for the voucher
varied with a respondent’s household income and whether or not the respondent had children enrolled in
public school.14
The results of the PPIC survey reveal that voters with children in public school were indeed more
likely to support the voucher than voters with no school-age children. For example, among voters with
children in public school, 54.2 percent of those with income between $20,000 and $39,999 stated they
would support the voucher initiative. In contrast, only 44.5 percent of voters with no school-age children
in the same income range stated they would support the voucher. However, contrary to expectations,
high-income voters with children were less likely to support the voucher than low-income voters with
children. Voters with children in the highest income groups were over 20 percentage points less likely to
support the voucher than voters with children in the lowest income group. In fact, voters with children in
the highest income group were no more likely to support the voucher than voters of similar income with
no school children. Thus, despite the fact that high-income families with children were the group most
constrained by school finance reform, they were also the group least likely to support the voucher.
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What explains these puzzling reactions? Our answer to that question begins with a fundamental
observation: school quality depends on more than just spending per pupil; it also depends on factors such
as the quality of a student’s peer group and school efficiency. To the extent that these other factors are
important determinants of school quality, equalizing spending will not equalize school quality. This point
was demonstrated by Nechyba (2003b, 2004) using a computable, general equilibrium model. In the
model, school quality depends on both spending per pupil and a vector of inputs correlated with parental
income. Those inputs include student peer quality, parental monitoring, and voluntary contributions. His
simulations suggest that centralization and the equalization of spending per pupil results in only a modest
decline in residential income segregation. With state finance, school districts are still stratified by
income, peer quality, and thus school quality. Epple and Romano (2003) reach a similar conclusion using
a general equilibrium model that characterizes how families sort across neighborhood schools within a
single school district. In their model, student achievement depends both on a student’s own ability
(which is assumed to be correlated with family income) and the ability of the student’s peer group.
Because all neighborhood schools are assumed to have the same level of spending per pupil, variation in
school quality arises solely from variation in average student peer quality across schools. Equilibrium in
their model is characterized by income, peer quality and school quality stratification, with the highestincome families living in neighborhoods with the highest quality schools (schools with the highest-quality
peer group), and the lowest-income families living in the neighborhoods with the lowest quality schools.
These studies suggest that even in California, where spending per pupil has been essentially
equalized, there may still be significant income stratification across neighborhood schools and school
districts, stratification that perpetuates large differences in school quality. To examine that possibility we
used data from the California Department of Education on the percentage free or reduced-price lunch
students (low-income students) in each elementary school in 2003-04. Figure 3 illustrates how lowincome students are distributed across the 2,127 elementary schools in the Los Angeles metropolitan area
and the 849 elementary schools in the San Francisco metropolitan area.15 In the figure, schools are ranked
in descending order according to their percentage of free or reduced price lunch students. If low-income
students were randomly distributed across schools, each school should contain roughly the same
percentage of these students. In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, this would imply that roughly 62% of
students in each school were eligible for free or reduced price lunch (as illustrated by the horizontal
dotted line). Similarly, in the San Francisco metropolitan area, random assignment would imply that
roughly 40% of student in each school were eligible for free or reduced price lunch. As Figure 3 makes
clear, however, that is not the case: in both the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas there is
a significant degree of income stratification across schools.16
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Figure 3
Distribution of Low-Income Students across Elementary Schools in 2003-04
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The stratification of schools by family income is also a stratification of schools by student
achievement. The relationship between student performance and family income is clearly represented in
Figure 2, a relationship that is consistent with the basic assumption underlying the model of Epple and
Romano: school quality depends both on a student’s own ability and the ability of his or her peers.
These differences in school quality may explain why high-income families were unwilling to
support the voucher. Numerous studies have shown that houses located in neighborhoods with highquality public schools sell at a significant premium. For example, using data on housing sales in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area in 1992-93, Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) find that homes located in
the best school districts sell at a significant premium. Similarly, using 1990 block-level Census data on
the value of homes located in the San Francisco Bay area, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003, 2005)
find that homes located in neighborhoods with high-quality schools command a significant premium.17
Because the voucher would have decreased the price of private alternatives to good public schools, it also
would have reduced the premium families would be willing to pay to live in such neighborhoods, causing
property values in those neighborhoods to fall. As a result, high-income families located in
neighborhoods with good public schools would have experienced significant capital losses had the
voucher been implemented.
The threat of such losses clearly provided those families with an incentive to vote against the
voucher. Brunner, Sonstelie, and Thayer (2001) find evidence consistent with that conclusion. Using
30

precinct-level voting returns from California’s 1993 voucher initiative, they find that homeowners located
in school districts with high housing price premiums were significantly less likely to support the voucher
than homeowners located in neighborhoods with low housing price premiums. They conclude that the
most plausible explanation for their results is that homeowners located in good school districts voted
against the voucher to protect their housing values. Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) reached the same
conclusion based on their analysis of individual voting behavior on California’s 2000 voucher initiative.
While the results of the studies discussed above may explain why homeowners located in good
school districts were unwilling to support the voucher, they can not explain why both California’s 1993
and 2000 voucher initiatives lost by a 2 to 1 margin. Does the overwhelming lack of support for school
vouchers suggest that Californians were by and large satisfied with their public schools? Results from the
PPIC’s August 2000 survey suggest the answer to that question is clearly no. When asked to grade the
quality of their local public schools on a scale of “A” to “F”, less than 10% of voters gave their local
public schools and “A” and more than 60% of voters gave their schools a grade of “C” or lower
(Baldassare (2000)). Evidently, even though the majority of California’s voters are unsatisfied with the
quality of their local public schools, that dissatisfaction has not engendered widespread support for school
vouchers.
5. Conclusion
The lessons to be drawn from California’s experience depend on the perspective one brings to it.
For champions of decentralized government, the lessons are easy to draw. Since the centralization of
school finance in California, school resources and student achievement have declined relative to other
states. Families have attempted to circumvent the centralized system by opting out into the private sector
and by using voluntary contributions and parcel taxes to supplement the inadequate public school
resources provided by the state. Centralization has been a dubious achievement.
For fiscal conservatives, the lessons are very different. Under local finance, commercial and
industrial property subsidized school spending. The subsidy was ended by Proposition 13, and now
families are facing the true cost of public school spending. Given that cost, they have chosen to spend
less, thus tempering the rapid rise in real spending per pupil over the last three decades (Hanushek and
Rivkin (1997)). The dismal performance of California students on achievement tests is a disappointment,
but that performance is due more to the inefficiency with which funds are deployed than to the paucity of
those funds.
For supporters of centralization, the lessons are more complicated. The centralization of school
finance has permitted the state to direct more resources to school districts serving low-income students.
Those students still do not perform at the level of other students, so there is more work to be done.
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Furthermore, families have done very little to circumvent the new system. Private school enrollment is
not significantly higher than other states, voluntary contributions are not a major factor, parcel taxes have
been enacted in only a few districts, and voters have overwhelming rejected the voucher. Centralized
finance is politically stable, thus providing a platform for an even more progressive redistribution of
educational resources.
Supporters of centralization might also add that their preferred system has not been given a fair
test. California has centralized the finance of its public schools without centralizing the governance of
those schools. This mismatch between finance and governance has undermined the effectiveness of the
school system and made centralization less successful than it could be. For example, because school
districts still engage in collective bargaining with their employees, the legislature feels obligated to tie up
funds in categorical programs that may undermine the effectiveness of those funds. Furthermore,
possibilities for addressing the needs of low-income students would likely increase if local governance
were eliminated. In the current system, those needs are addressed through categorical programs that
attempt to channel funds from the state to schools serving disadvantaged students. Those funds must pass
through school districts, however, where local politics may frustrate the state’s intention.
The transformation from local governance to state governance will not occur as rapidly as the
transformation from local finance to state finance. Though they handed the property tax to the state
legislature, the voters of California deeply distrust Sacramento, and it is impossible to imagine that they
would favor an initiative to eliminate school districts and local school boards. Yet, there are clear signs
that the institutions of local governance are crumbling. Schrag (1998) notes that, because property tax
rates are not determined at the local level, business in California has lost interest in local school districts,
diminishing a traditional source of fiscal conservatism on local school boards. California’s ambitious
accountability system has also eroded local governance. The state has yet to take over a failing school,
but it clearly has the power to do so, and it is only a matter of time before it does. Likewise, after an
initial experiment with bonuses for teachers in high performing schools, the state ran into fiscal
difficulties and suspended the program. However, it seems only logical that an improved system of
performance bonuses will be instituted as soon as the state’s budget improves. Lastly, it is not impossible
to imagine that the state’s current bi-level system of collective bargaining—once with the state legislature
and again with each school district—will yield to a more rational system of statewide collective
bargaining. Any one of these changes would make the others more likely.
Champions of decentralized government will argue the folly of this trend. A school system that
reports directly to Sacramento will become disconnected from the concerns of local residents, lose
political support, and deteriorate even further. For these critics of the current direction, hope lies with the
parcel tax. If the threshold for enacting the parcel tax were reduced to a simple majority, many more
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parcel taxes would be passed. Each such event would reconnect residents to their local school districts
and reinvigorate local governance. A constitutional amendment is required to reduce the two-thirds
requirement to a simple majority, but California’s constitution must be the most pliable of any state’s.
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In their petition to the California Supreme Court, the Serrano lawyers wrote, “the relative wealth of
school district residents correlates to a high degree with the relative wealth of school districts as
measured by the assessed valuation per pupil.”
The tabulation was done for only 739 of the 1,079 districts existing in 1969-70, but those 739 districts
enrolled 98 percent of students in 1969-70.
A few districts receive more property tax revenue than their revenue limit. Under the current law, they
keep that excess and also receive a small amount of basic aid from the state. The number of these
districts changes as their enrollments and property tax revenues change. However, the number has
never been large. Today there are only about 50 of these districts, enrolling less than 3 percent of the
state’s students.
Because a least squares regression is impossible when a regressor has an infinite value, Hoxby
estimated spending per student as a function of the inverse of the tax-price. California’s inverse taxprice is unity before Serrano and zero after Serrano. All school districts in New Mexico have inverse
tax-prices of unity before reform and 0.05 after reform. In Oklahoma, some districts have inverse taxprices as low as 0.15 after reform. In all other states, the lowest inverse tax-price after reform is 0.53
and inverse tax-prices are unity in 36 states after reform. Thus, the tax-price effect of school finance
reform appears to be primarily identified by the post-reform, relative decline in spending per pupil in
California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
For each year, Table 3A of the Appendix shows the maximum income for each decile measured in
2000 dollars.
While the IRS Master File includes all nonprofit organizations supporting K-12 schools in California, it
only contains revenue data for those organizations with revenues of $25,000 or more. Thus, we are
unable to identify the amount of revenue raised by organizations with revenues of less than $25,000.
As a result, our data provide a lower bound on the actual amount raised by organizations supporting
K-12 schools in California. For a detailed description of the methodology used to identify nonprofit
organizations supporting K-12 schools and the revenue raised by those organizations, see Brunner and
Sonstelie (1996) and Brunner and Imazeki (2005).
District-level data on average family income in 2000 was obtained from school district demographic
files prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on average family income by school attendance zone
is not available. As a result, we used data on the location of each school in California to match
schools to census tracts in 2000. We then used the average family income of the census tract in which
the school was located as a proxy for the average income of families within a school attendance zone.
Almost all school districts have imposed parcel taxes on a per-parcel basis (e.g. $100 per parcel) and
for a relatively short time period (e.g. five years).
The four counties analyzed were Los Angeles, San Diego, San Mateo, and Marin.
Two other districts, Albany Unified and Berkeley Unified have imposed parcel taxes that are based on
the square footage of property.
As noted by Brunner (2001), if tax revenues from a square footage parcel tax were subject to district
power equalization, a system of local school finance based on a square footage parcel tax would be
fiscally neutral. As a result, the square footage parcel tax could be turned into a viable and flexible
source of discretionary school revenue for school districts.
In 1993, voters in California placed Proposition 174 on the statewide ballot, an initiative that would
have provided parents with $2,600 for every child enrolled in a private school. In 2000, voters placed
Proposition 38 on the statewide ballot. That initiative would have provided parents with a scholarship
of approximately $4,000 for every child enrolled in private school.
For a more detailed description of the PPIC survey see Brunner and Sonstelie (2003).
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Of the 6,006 survey respondents, a total of 1,343 reported having children enrolled in public school
and also answered the questions about their household income and how they intended to vote on the
voucher initiative. Similarly, a total of 2,923 respondents reported having no school-age children and
answered the questions about household income and how they intended to voter on the voucher.
The Los Angeles metropolitan area includes the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, and
Riverside, while the San Francisco metropolitan area includes the counties of San Francisco, Alameda,
Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara.
Epple and Romano (2003) present similar evidence of income stratification across high schools in the
Los Angeles metropolitan area. Similarly, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003, 2005) estimate an
equilibrium model of residential sorting across neighborhood schools located in the San Francisco Bay
area. Their results reveal substantial stratification along racial and socioeconomic lines across
neighborhoods, with white, highly-educated, and high-income households clustering in neighborhoods
that contain the highest quality schools.
Note that the premiums found in these studies were not the result of higher spending per pupil since
school spending has been equalized in California. The premiums were primarily due to student peer
quality and other determinants of school quality that still vary across schools.
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Appendix
The median voters model is s = β 0 + β1v + β 2 y . Applying this linear relationship, the
correlation between spending per pupil, s, and median family income, y, is

ρ sy =

β1σ v ρ vy + β 2σ y

(

β12σ v2

+ 2β1 β 2 ρ vy σ vσ y +

)

1/ 2
β 22σ 2y

,

where σ v and σ y are the standard deviations of v and y across school districts and ρ sy and ρ vy are the
correlation coefficients of s and v with y across districts. When the correlation between assessed value
and income ( ρ vy ) is unity, the expression above also reduces to unity.
The partial derivative of ρ sy with respect to ρ vy is
∂ρ sy
∂ρ vy

=

(

β1σ y β12σ v2 + β1 β 2 ρ vy σ vσ y
σ s3

If β1 >0, β 2 >0, and ρ vy >0,

∂ρ sy
∂ρ vy

).

>0. Also, if ρ vy =0 and β 2 >0, ρ sy > 0 . Thus, assuming β1 >0,

β 2 >0, and ρ vy >0, ρ sy is a positive, increasing function of ρ vy , which reaches a maximum of unity
when ρ vy is unity.

Table 3A
Maximum Family Income for Family Income Deciles in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000

Decile
Lowest
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Highest

1970
$17,752
27,072
35,061
40,830
47,044
53,257
61,690
71,897
91,869

1980
$14,137
23,165
31,357
38,682
45,484
52,266
60,614
71,074
89,861

1990
$12,973
22,471
31,225
39,525
47,035
55,335
65,876
79,051
102,661

2000
$14,000
23,000
31,000
39,800
48,300
58,000
69,400
85,000
114,400
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